Russia and The AK 47: Africa Learns from Russia, USA and Europe
There is a famous
African proverb among the Chewa People: Those who don’t ask eat the wax!
The moral is that those who seek to understand are likely to make less mistakes. The wax talked about here is that of the bee hives. The proverb points out that those who may not know and don't ask may end up eating the hives and not the honey.
Russia and Africa share a thing in common: they are notoriously misunderstood and misrepresented in the more accessible forms of media. Also the subject of Russia or Africa is one that is not popular and easily dismissed as purely academic.
Russia and Africa share a thing in common: they are notoriously misunderstood and misrepresented in the more accessible forms of media. Also the subject of Russia or Africa is one that is not popular and easily dismissed as purely academic.
Africa is depicted as a
continent divided in three: The area North of Limpopo and South of Sahara (aka
Sub-Sahara Africa); Republic of South Africa; and the North Africa. These
names, make it is possible for the pen to label Africa in reinforced stereotypes. In cutting up Africa and mislabeling her to fit simplistic stereotypical shelves, we all fail to genuinely be part of the crafters of
positive development narratives about Africa.
Is Russia keen on
seeing Africa in a symbiotic cast or will their relation 200 years from now
turn out to reveal sinister and precarious machinations?
Is Africa learning
lessons as she is forced to avoid being weaned, but at the same time voice
needs while in nestle?
It will take pro-active
discernment to read between the lines as well as get African governments to
invest in social development projects.
Russia, is officially
the Russian Federation and the current president is President V. Putin. Unless,
one is discerning enough, the Russian Federation part may be missed. Instead
Russia is depicted as a very powerful but a “Dennis the menace” nation-state.
Popescu
(2009) alludes to this in a European Council on Foreign Relations report
titled: The
Limits of Enlargement-Lite: European and Russian Power in the Troubled
Neighbourhood. In it one traces
deliberate monitoring of Russia’s practices in the region.
The report’s
abstract is as follows:
“Over the past
year, war in Georgia, the Ukrainian gas crisis and the burning of the Moldovan
parliament have all dominated the front pages of European newspapers. But
behind the headlines the story is just as bleak: politics in the
“neighbourhood” is a toxic mixture of authoritarianism and stalled democracy,
ongoing secessionist tensions continue to stoke fears of violent conflict, and
the economic crisis is wreaking havoc throughout the region. The implications
for the EU are profound. Renewed hostilities or economic collapse could see an
influx of immigrants into eastern Member States. Several banks in western
Member States are exposed to the imploding economies in the east. But beyond
these immediate dangers, there is an emerging contest between the EU and Russia
over the political rules that are to govern the neighbourhood. Since the 2004
Orange revolution in Ukraine, Russia has been working tirelessly to draw the
countries of the region into its sphere of influence while the EU has continued
to pursue a technocratic strategy best described as “enlargement-lite” –
offering the neighbourhood states the prospect of eventual political and
economic alignment with the EU while dampening down any hopes of actual
accession.” The contrast is clear. Russia is the Nero. Europe is the discerning
Tacitus. But Russia is not ready to be
depicted by Europe as Roman historian Tacitus
described Nero’s period as “a period rich in disasters … even in peace full of
horrors.
Russian Soft Power
Russian soft power
supporting Africa can be seen in many ways: Lumumba University became the
education formation for many Africans; Military Academies in many former Soviet
Union countries were formative grounds for
many present day African rank and file in cities such as Sofia of Bulgaria; Technical expertise in the various
ministries of African governments have benefited from Russia in one way or
another.
Russian Symbolism as a metaphor for productive work
The AK 47 is perhaps
the most ubiquitous of Russian symbols, as the Converse shoe is for the USA or
Volkswagen Beetle is for the Germans or the Monarch is for the British.
According to the Business Insider report, “today, there are reported to be more than 100m Kalashnikov rifles in use worldwide. The weapon, which is favoured by both armies and militants, is said to be responsible for 250,000 deaths annually. An AK-47 appears on the flags of Mozambique and Hezbollah, as well as on the coats of arms of Zimbabwe and East Timor.” The image of an AK 47 is a metaphor for sophistication and adherence to strict rigours of technical or craft expertise that Russia can transfer to Africa.
According to the Business Insider report, “today, there are reported to be more than 100m Kalashnikov rifles in use worldwide. The weapon, which is favoured by both armies and militants, is said to be responsible for 250,000 deaths annually. An AK-47 appears on the flags of Mozambique and Hezbollah, as well as on the coats of arms of Zimbabwe and East Timor.” The image of an AK 47 is a metaphor for sophistication and adherence to strict rigours of technical or craft expertise that Russia can transfer to Africa.
Russia’s
Post-Cold war stance
An analysis of Russian Foreign Policy documents, points to a deliberate and strategic
determinism. Russia is now not only strategic but a confident active player-nation in the areas of foreign policy, peace interventions, finance,
energy speculation, technological expertise, space exploration, deep ocean
exploration, military, mineral exploration, research and development.
In the International Affairs journal, Monaghan (2008), highlights how “Russian foreign policy reflects an evolving balance between vulnerability and opportunity. For much of President Putin's second term, Russia has been on the defensive. Despite increasing economic strength, observed in greater activity and an apparently more confident rhetorical stance, Russian diplomacy reflected a sense of vulnerability in Moscow. Indeed, diplomacy was largely inward looking: on the one hand it was a tool with which to unite and mobilize the Russian population rather than confront the West; on the other hand, it was a means of preventing external interference in Russian domestic affairs. On another level, Moscow sees an international situation destabilized by the unilateral actions of the US and an attempt by the ‘western alliance’ to assert and export its value system. But Moscow also believes that the international situation has reached a moment of transition, one which presents an opportunity for a Russia that lays claim to a global role. Russian foreign policy reflects a broad consensus in Moscow that asserts Russia's status as a leading power with legitimate interests. This moment of opportunity coincides with Moscow's desire to rethink the results of the post-Cold War period and to establish Russia as a valid international player. Continuing constraints and recognition that its domestic priorities proscribe Moscow from seeking confrontation with the West, which it cannot afford. Nonetheless, the attempt to establish the legitimacy of sovereign democracy as an international model of development appears to represent an important development in how Russia will approach wider European politics.”
In the International Affairs journal, Monaghan (2008), highlights how “Russian foreign policy reflects an evolving balance between vulnerability and opportunity. For much of President Putin's second term, Russia has been on the defensive. Despite increasing economic strength, observed in greater activity and an apparently more confident rhetorical stance, Russian diplomacy reflected a sense of vulnerability in Moscow. Indeed, diplomacy was largely inward looking: on the one hand it was a tool with which to unite and mobilize the Russian population rather than confront the West; on the other hand, it was a means of preventing external interference in Russian domestic affairs. On another level, Moscow sees an international situation destabilized by the unilateral actions of the US and an attempt by the ‘western alliance’ to assert and export its value system. But Moscow also believes that the international situation has reached a moment of transition, one which presents an opportunity for a Russia that lays claim to a global role. Russian foreign policy reflects a broad consensus in Moscow that asserts Russia's status as a leading power with legitimate interests. This moment of opportunity coincides with Moscow's desire to rethink the results of the post-Cold War period and to establish Russia as a valid international player. Continuing constraints and recognition that its domestic priorities proscribe Moscow from seeking confrontation with the West, which it cannot afford. Nonetheless, the attempt to establish the legitimacy of sovereign democracy as an international model of development appears to represent an important development in how Russia will approach wider European politics.”
Russia’s Self
Determination and Re-invention
Russia has maintained
herself as a nation that supported herself through reconstruction. By having plans in place, the Russians have a clear path toward economic growth,
independence and development. The strategic approaches can be mined from various
policy documents. I have limited myself to the period 2000-present time.
According to the report by Gonzalez (2013) titled: The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation: A Comparative Study, Russia has formulated a
systematic approach to doing business. This reflects the Putin-Medvedev-Putin
era. What one should note is that, there
is so much that goes into how nations can develop themselves or gain the
support ( or subversion ) of others. There is a parallel between Weimar and
Nazi Germany of the 1920’s-1950s and present-day Russia.
Russia Compared to post-war
reparation era Germany
Molina (2003) points
out the reasons why German did not recover so fast after World War I, were that
German goods faced tariffs and heavy conditions imposed by France, England and
other countries. One such condition was that France had to occupy Germany Ruhr
Industrial complex as part of the reparations for war. Germany had embarked on
a Social spending policy that way the Germans could buy German-made products.
This in turn meant the money was re-invested in Germany economy. However, this
failed and caused so much bitterness among the people. This bitterness would
later turn out to galvanize the Germans who rallied behind Hitler in future. It took other more lenient plans to get
Germany to develop at a faster rate and since then, they have stayed developed.
One such intervention came from USA in form of the Dawes Plan. The Dawes Plan of
1924 was an agreement between the Allies and Germany. The basic idea behind the
plan was to make it easier for Germany to pay reparations using reparations
gold reserves as well as other means such as legal prosecutions for wrong-doing
and it had two key parts:
1. Reparations were reduced in the short term
to 50 million pounds per year
2. The United States gave loans of $25 billion
to Germany to help rebuild its industrial capacity (this made it easier for
Germany to generate the tax revenues needed to meet reparations).
As a result,
reparations payments resumed, the Germans invested in Technical education,
enrolled many Germans into school, graduates had jobs and the Germans were able
to take over strategic Banking and the Ruhr Industrial Sectors. These measures
helped to improve the German economy as German industry thrived with the support
of the loans and employment increased. Tax revenues also increased and
employment grew. In Journal article
by Costigliola 1976) titled: “The United
States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s,” he argues that the
foreign economic policy of the United States in the aftermath of World War I
was not isolationist, but selectively interventionist. With a group of very
able American businessmen-diplomats in the lead, the nation pressured the
French to accept the Dawes Plan, helped solve the reparations problem,
encouraged healthy economic recovery and growth (which embraced large sales of
American capital goods to Germany), and ensured peaceful contentment in Europe. Most of the WW I, occurred in France and destroyed large parts of the country. So, France felt so bitter and required enormous reparations. Other players were the private businesses that expected to make profits out of the money they would lend to Germany. So, this diversity of interests at both private and public levels, ensured losses were
socialized and gains were privatized. This still left Germany in a worse off
place and stoked angry sentiments too.
Hallmarks of a
Geopolitical Influencer
Scholars on Germany talk
about two things. One is, the reasons why it took long to recover. Secondly, is the fact that she is now a
super power, she should take on Global leadership roles.
Three such reasons for slow growth given by Kagan (2019) were: Germany is a young nation, found in the center of a very turbulent continent and Germany’s Sonderweg, the unique and troubled path the nation took to modern democracy, by way of failed liberal revolution, hereditary monarchy, authoritarianism, frail democracy, and, finally, totalitarianism, all in the first seven decades of its existence.
But, Kagan, also points out now that “the Germans have become arguably the most liberal and pacific people in the world, everyone’s choice to take on the now unclaimed mantle of ‘leader of the free world.’ Many on both sides of the Atlantic want to see more assertiveness from Germany, not less, in the global economy, in diplomacy, and even militarily.”
This has insights for Africans to pick up lessons from. It could also be that Russia is learning lessons from Germany and would not like to repeat same mistakes. The other lesson to learn from all this is that a nation has to consolidate her potential forces for development. According to King (2019), United States has a global role to play because of it boasts of a heritage rooted in respect for life and dignity. It should be as “vindicator of the prerogatives of other democratic nation-states”—in other words, a defender of the idea that a world of culturally defined nations is humanity’s state of nature. Russia, seems to have picked up a lesson from these examples.
Three such reasons for slow growth given by Kagan (2019) were: Germany is a young nation, found in the center of a very turbulent continent and Germany’s Sonderweg, the unique and troubled path the nation took to modern democracy, by way of failed liberal revolution, hereditary monarchy, authoritarianism, frail democracy, and, finally, totalitarianism, all in the first seven decades of its existence.
But, Kagan, also points out now that “the Germans have become arguably the most liberal and pacific people in the world, everyone’s choice to take on the now unclaimed mantle of ‘leader of the free world.’ Many on both sides of the Atlantic want to see more assertiveness from Germany, not less, in the global economy, in diplomacy, and even militarily.”
This has insights for Africans to pick up lessons from. It could also be that Russia is learning lessons from Germany and would not like to repeat same mistakes. The other lesson to learn from all this is that a nation has to consolidate her potential forces for development. According to King (2019), United States has a global role to play because of it boasts of a heritage rooted in respect for life and dignity. It should be as “vindicator of the prerogatives of other democratic nation-states”—in other words, a defender of the idea that a world of culturally defined nations is humanity’s state of nature. Russia, seems to have picked up a lesson from these examples.
Russian
Statehood and Foreign Policy
The new ideology is to fill in gaps. According Light (2006) in an article titled: In search of an identity: Russian
foreign policy and the end of ideology, Russian Federation obsession now is
to establish Russia’s new identity and fill the vacuum left by
Marxism-Leninism. They also served to establish a consensus about the main
principles of Russian foreign policy. Later concepts responded to perceived
changes in Russia’s internal and external environment. They provide a map by
which one can chart the evolution of Russian thinking about the world and
Russia’s place in it. Although they reflect Russia’s current national values
and fulfill important roles, they represent an attempt to deal with the end of
ideology, rather than an endeavour to create a substitute ideology.” The main goal of the foreign policy of Russia
defined what a society would be at first in 2000; then it went into the realm
of how the society would benefit the individual through ensuring peace and
security in 2008; and by 2013 the priority was how interests that arise in such
relations are addressed mutually. Accordingly, in 2000, the priority was “To
protect citizens' and society's interests. In 2008, the priority was to protect citizens', society's and State's interests. And in, 2013, it was to Guarantee
the protection of citizens', society's and State's interests,” (Gonzalez,
2013).
According to Kurowska ( 2014), in an journal article titled: Multipolarity as resistance to liberal norms: Russia's position on responsibility to protect, Russia managed to overcome lawlessness experienced in a period termed by scholars as Bespredel and Betrayal to a time where there is accountability. Currently, there are structures that conform to internationally approved laws and regulations. There is a unique position Russia finds herself and the nature of kinship with other former Soviet Union states. Sometimes this relation spills into interventionist roles where Russia is forced to occupy other neighbouring countries.
According to Forsberg (2017) in an article titled: The Psychological Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy: Putin and the Annexation of Crimea, Putin is forced to portray the image of a protector of Russia. Russia had a higher willingness to take risks in the context of the Ukrainian crisis.
Lessons For Africa
According to Kurowska ( 2014), in an journal article titled: Multipolarity as resistance to liberal norms: Russia's position on responsibility to protect, Russia managed to overcome lawlessness experienced in a period termed by scholars as Bespredel and Betrayal to a time where there is accountability. Currently, there are structures that conform to internationally approved laws and regulations. There is a unique position Russia finds herself and the nature of kinship with other former Soviet Union states. Sometimes this relation spills into interventionist roles where Russia is forced to occupy other neighbouring countries.
According to Forsberg (2017) in an article titled: The Psychological Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy: Putin and the Annexation of Crimea, Putin is forced to portray the image of a protector of Russia. Russia had a higher willingness to take risks in the context of the Ukrainian crisis.
Lessons For Africa
Russia is
a key player today in world affairs and has the hallmarks of a powerful and
influential kind. Such hallmarks include the wherewithal to organize policies
for self-development and facilitate them. Russia, avoided the problems faced by
post Weimar and Nazi Germany which had to play by agreements for reparations. Many of these were so punitive, suffocating, economically and psychologically damaging. Russia, has avoided the kind of politically supported ethno-nationalism that calls for valourizing certain races and regression of other races. This kind of policy has midwifed slavery, racism, apartheid, holocausts, genocides, mass evictions from land and World Wars. These two areas are lessons African can pick up from Russia. Africa, lacks financial credit to facilitate social development programmes and has to rely on loans and begging. In her case, she needs one who is willing to soften the interests on the loans. Russia has come out as the kind of nation willing to work
with Africa and show her the things that needed to first be done. Africa,
needed to get her diverse house in cultural, political, legal, social and economic order through
having instruments that galvanize support, win popular participation by the people who will benefit, can be referred to in case of disputes and are fair enough so as to evoke respect and no resorting to wars or animosity. This way, rule of law, electoral and liberal democracies will increase in Africa. This leads to increased volume of goods, services and people engaged productively. Consequently, benefits of wealth will flow all ways; policy formulation will be regularly facilitated; enhanced multiparty democracy will increasingly be upheld; and strengthened institutional capacity for African governments and non governments.
![]() |
| Statue of Mikhail Kalashnikov in unveiled in Moscow. Photograph: TASS/Barcroft Images |

Comments
Post a Comment